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Abstract 
China has continuous reforms in health sector since its economic reform in 1978. The 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the health sector in China and provide policy 
recommendations for healthcare reforms. A historical review on the reform process provided 
implications of challenging problems in China’s health sector. Hospitals are classified into 
three grades and prices for healthcare services are regulated. It is believed that efficiency 
could be improved by applying more appropriate pricing scheme. A quality competitive 
model of hospitals under regulated price was developed in this thesis. The author analyzed 
the effect of expanding price difference among hospitals within the model. The results of the 
model demonstrated that hospitals have higher incentive to improve healthcare quality after 
increasing regulated price. However, the impact of expanding price difference depends on 
other socioeconomic conditions. Hence policymakers need to pay careful attention to various 
aspects of the health sector when applying this strategy. 
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1 Introduction 
China launched a new plan of healthcare reform in 2009 aiming at solving the “kan bing nan, 
kan bing gui” problem (decreasing access to healthcare and increasing expenditure on 
healthcare) in the health sector. The phenomenon that high-grade hospitals are overcrowded 
while low-grade hospitals are underutilized is one of the most debated topics in healthcare 
reform. In China, public hospitals are classified into three grades according to health 
resources and functions. Generally, high-grade hospitals are able to provide higher quality 
healthcare services and treat more complicated diseases. Prices for healthcare services are 
regulated. Historically, there is little price difference for the same treatment provided by 
different hospitals. Some believe that expanding price difference among hospitals can 
mitigate demand pressure on high-grade hospitals and improve the utilization rate of low-
grade hospitals; and suggest that pricing leverage should be used to coordinate demand and 
supply of healthcare (Hu, 2006; Yin, 2009). This suggestion has been accepted by some 
provinces (e.g., Jiangsu Province and Anhui Province) and a trial project has been launched. 
Hence it is very important to understand the effects of changes in regulated prices on the 
supply of and demand for healthcare services. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a theoretical model of the strategies of high-grade 
hospitals and low-grade hospitals facing regulated prices, analyze the effect of expanding 
price difference and find some implications for the health sector reform in China.  
Existing models of hospital behaviours or physicians’ behaviours under regulated prices 
mainly focus on the pricing structure. Eggleston and Yip (2004) have developed a model of 
public-private hospital competition under regulated prices. They note that prices of basic 
services are regulated at a low level to assure access for basic healthcare in China while 
prices for other services are set high to allow hospitals to recover revenue. Their results 
show that the distorted price structure leads to over/under use of services by profitability, 
which in turn fuels cost escalation and reduces access for those who cannot afford to self-
pay for care. Chen, Liu and Wang (2008) have developed a vocational choice model of 
doctors under regulated price. People’s willingness to enter the healthcare market and hence 
the supply of healthcare are closely associated with the regulated prices for healthcare. When 
prices could not reflect physicians’ ability, people with high ability choose not to enter the 
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market. The supply of high quality level of healthcare services could then not meet people’s 
demand and hence access to high quality healthcare services is limited. Physicians who are 
already in the healthcare market would induce patients to use more pharmaceuticals to 
compensate their income which in turn leads to increasing expenditure on healthcare. They 
conclude that regulated price is the root cause of problems confronting the health sector in 
China and recommend softening price regulation to solve these problems. 
The existing literature does not capture the characteristics of hospital classification and 
demand-supply situation of different grade hospitals in China. In this thesis, we develop an 
asymmetric duopoly model to capture competition between different grade hospitals. In our 
model, we assume hospitals choose quality levels of healthcare services to maximize their 
profits under regulated prices. Patients decide which hospital to choose by comparing 
qualities and prices of healthcare services provided by different hospitals. 
We find that a hospital has higher incentive to improve healthcare quality after increasing its 
price. Then competition between hospitals urges other hospitals to improve quality also. But 
the equilibrium demand for a hospital’s health service increases depends on not only its 
quality but also its price. The effect of expanding price difference on demand for healthcare 
services depends on the price elasticity of demand for healthcare services, hospitals’ cost 
functions and the relative price change of different hospitals. Hence policymakers need to 
pay careful attention to various aspects of the health sector when applying this strategy. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a historical review 
of the health sector reform in China and summarizes implications of the reform. The 
historical review introduces the evolution of the health sector in China after economic 
reform in 1978. I describe the main challenging implications of the reform process and 
proceed to discuss the last one in detail. The third chapter develops the quality competitive 
model of hospitals and displays the analytic results. The last chapter contains the 
conclusions of results and policy recommendations. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Historical review of the health sector in China 
China had an almost thirty-year period of planned economy after its foundation in 1949 and 
started its economic reform from a planned economy to a market economy in 1978 
(commonly called as “reform and opening-up” in China). Along with the development of 
economic reform in various areas, the health sector was inevitably affected. Old systems 
were collapsed or outdated under the new socioeconomic environment. Following this, a 
series of reforms toward marketization and modernization in the health sector have been 
piloted and carried out. The question whether the health sector should be market-led or 
government-led has sparked heated debates and never ceased since the early 1990s. Wang 
(2008) made a review on reforms in the health sector, and divided the process after 1978 into 
five periods. In this section, I will follow Wang’s division and introduce a review on 
evolution and reform in China’s health sector. 
2.1.1 Period I (1978-1985) 
This was a transitional period of reconstruction and reform in the health sector. Before 1980, 
the aim of the health sector administration was restoration and reconstruction of the 
healthcare system which was heavily destroyed during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). 
After 1980, emphasis of healthcare was gradually transferred to reform in the health sector 
(Wang, 2008). 
Policy: In 1979, the former Minister of Health Qian Xinzhong, proposed to “use economic 
means to administer the health sector” in an interview. And at the national conference of 
health bureau directors, it was claimed that “the (current) emphasis of the health sector 
administration should be the modernisation of the health sector”. That same year, the 
Ministry of Health applied “fixed subsidies, economic measurement as well as punishment 
and reward according to results”. 
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In August 1980, the State Council approved and transmitted the “consulting report on 
allowing private healthcare practice” submitted by the Ministry of Health, which marked the 
start to break the situation of all public-owned hospitals.1
Evolution: In rural areas, over 90% of the population was covered by the Cooperative 
Medical Scheme (CMS) before 1978. In urban areas, “the Government Insurance Scheme 
and Labour Insurance Scheme provided almost free healthcare to the employees of the 
government agencies and public institutions”. However, the CMS gradually collapsed 
following the collapse of collective production. After that for a long time, most of the rural 
population had no health insurance coverage but paid for services out-of-pocket (Tang et al., 
2008). 
2.1.2 Period II (1985-1992) 
1985 was the first year that the healthcare reform was officially launched in China. The core 
ideas of the reform at that time were decentralization of power, allowing hospitals to retain 
larger share of profits, and expansion of hospital autonomy. 
Policy: In April 1985, the State Council approved and transmitted a document submitted by 
the Ministry of Health.2 The document proposed to “reform, relax policies, streamline 
administration and decentralize, and raise funds from multi-channels”, which unveiled a 
prelude to the transformation of healthcare institutions. 
In 1989 the State Council approved and transmitted the document “suggestions on expansion 
of medical and healthcare services”.3 The document proposed five measures: (1) actively 
promote various forms of contract and responsibility system; 4  (2) encourage health 
 
1 Ministry of Health, (1980): Guanyu Yunxu Geti Yisheng Kaiye Xingyi Wenti de Qingshi Baogao (consulting report on 
allowing private healthcare practice), policy document. 
2 Ministry of Health, (1985): Guanyu Weisheng Gongzuo Gaige Ruogan Zhengce Wenti de Baogao (Report on Several 
Policies concerning Healthcare Reform), (Guo Fa [1985] No. 62), policy document. 
3 Ministry of Health, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Personnel, the State Price Bureau and the State Administration of 
Taxation(1989): “suggestions on expansion of medical and healthcare services”, (Guo Fa [1989] No. 10), policy document. 
4 The contract and responsibility system “was a practice in China starting from 1981. The major change from the past 
egalitarian distribution method was that individual companies and managers were now responsible for their own losses and 
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institutions to provide paid supplementary service; (3) further adjust fees for healthcare 
services;(4) health preventive and protective institutions would provide paid services;(5) 
suggest public hospitals “yi fu bu zhu, yi gong zhu yi” (a policy requiring public healthcare 
institutions to carry out profitable production of side-products to recover revenue).5 Health 
institutions were exempted from tax for three years to carry out other businesses.  
In November 1989, the Ministry of Health enacted the rule “Regulations for Hospital 
Classification”. 6  Hospitals became classified into three grades according to hospital 
functions, hospital resources, medical facilities as well as physician expertise. The first grade 
hospitals are basic hospitals and community hospitals directly providing preventive 
medicine, diagnosis services, treatment services and convalesce services to its community. 
The second grade hospitals are district hospitals providing comprehensive healthcare 
services to more than one community and conducting certain level of teaching and 
researching tasks. The third grade hospitals are hospitals providing high-level and 
specialized healthcare services to more than one district and conducting higher education 
and researching tasks. Every three years, there is a hospital evaluation by the government. 
Hospitals participating in the evaluation get a score according to their comprehensive 
performance during the past three years. Within each grade, hospitals are further divided into 
three levels according to their evaluation score. For example, a third grade hospital is labeled 
as level A when it receives a score no less than 900 which represents outstanding 
performance in hospital management, technology, service quality and other aspects. A third 
grade level B hospital has a score between 750 and 899. When its evaluation score is lower 
than 750, a third grade hospital is labeled as level C and required to take concrete measures 
to improve its performance.  
The reform during this period focused on management and operation mechanism. The 
government did not provide funding when implementing these healthcare reforms. Direct 
gains by contract with the government. it was first adopted in agriculture and later extended to other sectors of the 
economy ”(Juan Du, 2009). 
5 For example, hospitals can set up pharmaceutical retaining stores and other related production to seek profit. In August 
1988 Jintan Chinese Medicine Hospital set up a medical plastic material plant to implement the policy spirit. 
6 See Appendix C for description in detail. 
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investment by the government in the health sector gradually reduced and hospitals were 
encouraged to embrace market mechanism for development.  
2.1.3 Period III (1992-2000) 
Policy: In September 1992, the State Council issued the document “Opinions on deepening 
healthcare reform”.7 By implementing the document spirit the Ministry of Health required 
hospitals to make new achievements on “yi fu bu zhu, yi gong zhu yi”. The government gave 
fixed subsidies to hospitals. Hospitals were required to increase revenue by economic 
means.This health policy stimulated hospitals’ profit-driven behaviours, and also affected 
hospitals’ role as public welfare institutions, which became the root cause of problems in the 
health sector - decreasing access to and increasing expenditure on healthcare service (“kan 
bing nan, kan bing gui”). 
Evolution: “Although the majority of Chinese health facilities are publicly owned, they rely 
heavily on revenue-generating activities for financial survival. Consequently, while most 
health facilities are “public” in terms of ownership, they are really “private, for-profit” in 
terms of behavior. As of the early 1990s, government subsidies for public health facilities 
have represented a mere 10% of the facilities’ total revenues. To keep healthcare affordable, 
the government sets prices for basic healthcare below cost. At the same time, the 
government wants facilities to survive financially, so it sets prices for new and high-tech 
diagnostic services above cost and allow a 15% profit margin on drugs” (Yip & Hsiao, 
2009). 
In May 1993, regarding hospitals’ profit-driven tendency, a series of debates was launched 
in the Ministry of Health. At the national working conference on the health sector issues, the 
deputy Minister of Health Yin Dakui openly opposed to marketization in the health sector 
and called for public-welfare property of healthcare services and basic social healthcare 
equality. Since then, debates on whether healthcare should be government-led or market-led 
have never ceased. 
 
7 The State Council (1992): Guanyu Shenhua Weisheng Yiliao Tizhi Gaige de Jidian Yijian (Opinions on deepening 
healthcare reform), policy document. 
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2.1.4 Period IV (2000-2005) 
During this period, different reform directions took place. Market-orientation has played a 
significant role but has also gradually exposed its drawbacks, especially after the outbreak of 
SARS. Market-led or government-led debates deepened and laid a foundation for next 
period’s reform.  
Policy: In February 2000, the State Council issued a policy document “Guidance Proposals 
on Institutional Reform in Urban Medicine and Pharmaceuticals System”.8 Since then, 
hospitals are classified as for-profit and not-for-profit and administered accordingly. Not-
for-profit public hospitals receive subsidies from the local government. For example, the 
municipal governments provide subsidies to municipal hospitals. County level hospitals 
were subsidized by their county government. For-profit hospitals have no subsidies from the 
government. Prices for health services of not-for-profit are set according to cost which 
deduced fiscal subsidies and spread income from pharmaceuticals. For-profit hospitals 
should implement the guidance price set by the government. 
In January 2003, the State Council approved and transmitted “Proposals on Establishment of 
New Cooperative Medical Scheme”.9 It proposes to launch a pilot project of the New 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCME) in small areas first and then gradually roll out 
nationwide. The aim of NCMS is to achieve universal coverage of basic social medical 
insurance for rural residents by 2010. 
Evolution: In 2000, the first public hospital was privatized by auction in Suqian, Jiangsu 
Province. Suqian was the poorest city of Jiangsu province and the municipal government 
faced a debt burden at that time. Hospitals there had insufficient funding and sometimes the 
wages of workers in health institutions could not be paid on time. The then mayor intended 
to attract non-government capital by privatization of healthcare (Chow, 2006). 
 
8 The Institutional Reform Office of the State Council, et al (2000): Guanyu Chengzhen Yiyao Weisheng Tizhi Gaige de 
Zhidao Yijian (Guidance Proposals on Institutional Reform in Urban Medicine and Pharmaceuticals System), (Guo Fa 
[2000] No.16), policy document. 
9 The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture (2003): Guanyu Jianli Xinxing Nongcun 
Hezuo Yiliao Zhidu de Yijian (Proposals on Establishment of New Cooperative Medical Scheme), (Guo Fa [2003], No.3), 
policy document. 
  8
                                             
The financial burden of healthcare on rural and urban households increased. According to 
statistical data, aggregate healthcare expenditures in China increased from 11.02 billion 
RMB in 1978 to 50.25 billion RMB in 2001.10 Individual out-of-pocket payments as a share 
of total health expenditure grew from 20% to 60% between 1978 and 2001.11 People paid a 
significant fraction of their income on health expenditure. Yip and Hsiao (2009) state that 
“between 1993 and 2003, health expenditure as a share of household income increased, on 
average, from 8.2% to 10.7% in rural areas and from 6.0% to 7.2% in urban areas.” 
2.1.5 Period V (after 2005) 
On July 28 2005, “China Youth Daily” published a report made by the Development and 
Research Center of the State Council. By providing a review and reflection on healthcare 
reform over the years, the report concluded that China's health system reform was basically 
unsuccessful. This conclusion was mainly built on a market-led and government-led debate. 
Because of this report, 2005 became the starting point of a new round of healthcare reform. 
Policy: At the beginning of 2006, the State Council issued the “Guidance on Development of 
Urban Community Healthcare Service” which announced to maintain the public-welfare 
nature of the healthcare service, emphasis on equity, efficiency and access of healthcare, 
keep government-led and encourage social involvement.12 After that, extensive debates and 
conferences were launched regarding the direction of reform in the health sector. 
In October 2006, the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party adopted the “resolutions of the CPC Central Committee on major issues 
regarding the building of a harmonious socialist society.” It specifically identified healthcare 
reform as a national priority and the government has committed to strengthen government 
responsibility.  
 
10 China Healthcare Statistical Yearbook 2009 
11 See Appendix B for data in detail. 
12 The State Council (2006): Guanyu Fazhan Chengshi Shequ Weisheng Fuwu de Zhidao Yijian(Guidance on Development 
of Urban Community Healthcare Service), (Guo Fa [2006] No.10), policy document. 
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In April 2009, China finally launched a new healthcare reform plan in which the Chinese 
government pledged a stronger role for government in ensuring equity in healthcare services. 
“The government announced that it will spend an additional 850 billion yuan over the next 
three years to invest in five specific areas: (1)expand insurance coverage with a target of 
achieving universal coverage by 2011, with significant demand subsidies for the rural 
population to enroll in the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) and for the urban 
uninsured to enroll in the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance Scheme (URBMI); (2) 
increase government spending on public health services especially in lower- income regions 
with the goal of equalizing public health spending across regions; (3) establish primary-care 
facilities – community health centers in urban areas an township health centers in rural areas 
– which will serve as gate-keepers in the long run; (4) reform the pharmaceutical market; 
and (5) pilot test public hospital reforms” (Yip & Hsiao, 2009). 
2.2 Implications of reform in the health sector 
2.2.1 Increase insurance coverage 
The establishment of the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) for rural residents and 
Basic Medical Insurance for Urban Residents (BMISUR) were responses to accumulating 
evidence that limited health insurance has been one of the fundamental causes of 
unaffordable healthcare, and increasing public criticism on the government's negligence over 
the people's health insurance (Wagstaff et al., 2009). A significant proportion of the 
population had no health insurance of any form until the early 2000s. 
The financial burden of healthcare on rural and urban households has increased significantly 
since 1978. Individual’s out-of-pocket payments as a share of total health expenditure grew 
from 20% to 60% between 1978 and 2001.13 Increasing expenditure causes additional 
financial burden to poor households. “According to National Health Surveys, between 1998 
and 2003, the proportion of people ill in the last two weeks who did not see care for financial 
reasons increased in both urban and rural areas” (Ministry of Health, 2004; Eggleston et al., 
2008). 
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In 2003, China launched the NCMS program for rural residents. The objective is to establish 
universal coverage of basic health insurance for rural residents. The NCMS is financed by 
contributions from the central government, local governments, and individuals. When the 
program started in 2003, both the central and the local government subsidized 10 Yuan per 
capita each year in the poorer central and western regions, with individuals paying an 
additional 10 Yuan in annual premiums to enroll in the NCMS.14 In 2006, the minimum 
requirement for central and local government subsidy both increased to 20 Yuan per 
capita.15 In 2008, the central and local government further increased subsidy to 40 Yuan per 
capita, and individuals were required to pay 20 Yuan.16 Since 2010, the annual subsidies 
both from central government and local government have increased to 60 Yuan per capita 
with individual contribution increased to 30 Yuan.17
The Basic Medical Insurance Scheme for Urban Residents (BMISUR), covering children, 
the elderly, the disabled, and other non-working urban residents, started from 2007. The 
objective is to provide basic health insurance to the urban uninsured population. People 
covered by the BMISUR receive subsidies provided by governments ranging from 40 Yuan 
to 80 Yuan per capita, depending on the region's economic status and the social vulnerability 
of population groups.18 The BMISUR is a complementary scheme to the Basic Medical 
Insurance Scheme for Urban Employees (BMISUE). The BMISUE provides health 
insurance to urban employees. It evolves from the Government Insurance Scheme (GIS) and 
Labor Insurance Scheme (LIS), which dated back to the planned economy era and provided 
13 See Appendix B for data in detail. 
14 The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture (2003): Guanyu Jianli Xinxing Nongcun 
Hezuo Yiliao Zhidu de Yijian (Proposals on Establishment of New Cooperative Medical Scheme), (Guo Fa [2003] No.3), 
Beijing, policy document. 
15 The Ministry of Health et al. (2006): Guanyu Jiakuai Tuijin Xinxing Nongcun Hezuo Yiliao Shidian Gongzuo de 
Tongzhi (Notification of accelerating the pilot progress of New Cooperative Medical Scheme), Beijing, policy document. 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohncwsgls/s3581/200804/31106.htm 
16 The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance (2008): Guanyu Zuohao 2008 nian Xinxing Nongcun Hezuo Yiliao 
Gongzuo de Tongzhi (Notification of the construction of rural New Cooperative Medical Scheme in 2008), Beijing, policy 
document. http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohncwsgls/s3581/200804/31097.htm 
17 The State Council (2009): Guanyu Shenhua Yiyao Weisheng Tizhi Gaige de Yijian (Guidance on Deepening Health and 
Medical Institutional Reform), Beijing, policy document. 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/mohzcfgs/s7846/200904/39847.htm 
18 The State Council (2007): Guanyu Kaizhan Chengzhen Jumin Jiben Yiliao Baoxian Shidian de Zhidao Yijian (Guidance 
on Pilot Experienment of Basic Meical Insurance for Urban Residents), (Guo Fa [2007] No.20), Beijing, policy document. 
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healthcare to the employees of the government agencies and public institutions. The 
BMISUE is financed with a payroll tax, nominally divided between employer and employee 
(Eggleston & Yip, 2004; Tang et al., 2008; Dong, 2009). 
2.2.2 Strengthen government role in healthcare supply 
The Chinese government took full responsibility in healthcare supply before economic 
reform in 1978. All hospitals were state-owned and all health workers were paid by the 
government. Following the economic reform, the government has tried to retreat from 
supplying healthcare and has introduced market mechanisms in the health sector. From the 
early 2000s, however, the government committed to increase spending and strengthen its 
role in healthcare supply. This implicates a returning back to a government-led health sector. 
Statistically, aggregate healthcare expenditures in China increased from 11.02 billion Yuan 
in 1978 to 112.89 billion Yuan in 2007.19 Supply in healthcare didn’t increase accordingly 
with the rapid increase in demand. From 1978 to 2007, the number of health workers, the 
number of hospital beds and the number of health institution only increased from 3.11 
billion to 5.91 billion, from 2.04 billion to 3.70 billion, and from 169.73 thousand to 298.41 
thousand respectively.20
Since the first reform in 1985, the government has reduced spending in healthcare and 
requires hospitals to sustain financially themselves. Government spending as a share of total 
health expenditure decreased from 32.2% to 15.7% between 1978 and 2002.21 Without 
universal health insurance coverage, prices for basic healthcare were set below cost by the 
government to assure access to healthcare. To allow hospitals to recover revenue, the 
government sets prices for new and high-tech diagnostic services above cost and allows a 
15% profit margin on drugs (Yip & Hsiao, 2009). Eggleston and Yip (2004) noted that the 
average percentage of Chinese public hospital income from governments shrank from 17% 
in 1985 to 7% in 1999. Over the same period an increasing percentage of public hospital 
income came from user fees (26 to 37%) and drug sales (39% to 50%). The decrease in 
 
19 See “China Healthcare Statistical Yearbook 2009” 
20 See Appendix A for data in detail. 
21 See Appendix B for data in detail. 
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government subsidies has caused a significant reliance of public hospitals on non-state 
revenues, primarily in the form of user fees and drug sales. And the pricing scheme for 
healthcare and drugs has caused distorted incentives for hospitals which over-prescribe 
drugs and high-tech procedures. This is a root cause of reduced access to and rapidly 
increasing expenditure on healthcare. 
Actually the Chinese government has recognized the distorted incentive of the pricing 
scheme and has intended to reduce the distortion since the early 2000s. In October 2001, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health and other related bureaus issued “Guidance on 
improving compensation institution and implement compensation policy of urban healthcare 
facilities”. The document announced to gradually increase prices of professional services, 
reduce prices of large-scale health equipment test, encourage local government to increase 
investment into healthcare and implement financial subsidy policy to public non-profit 
hospitals. 
In 2007, the minister of Health Chen Zhu said in an interview that the core idea of public 
hospital reform was to reform the compensation institution. Currently, there are three 
compensation streams for public hospitals - government subsidies, user charges and revenue 
from drug sales. Since government spending in healthcare has been in serious shortage for a 
long time and government subsidies as a share in health expenditure is only 17%, health 
institutions primarily rely on user charges and drug sales to sustain financially. The reform 
intends to gradually reduce hospitals’ profit-seeking behavior from drug sales. And to 
maintain public hospital operation, either government subsidies or user charges should be 
increased to replace hospital revenue from selling drugs. 
In April 2009, a new healthcare reform plan was launched in China. In the plan, the 
government announced that it will spend an additional 850 billion Yuan over the next three 
years in healthcare. Two of the five specific areas that the plan intends to invest are 
increasing government spending on public health services and reforming the pharmaceutical 
market. 
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2.2.3 Improve efficiency in healthcare utilization 
Another implication of reforms in the health sector is the inefficiency in healthcare 
utilization. Some studies have documented inefficiencies in healthcare utilization in China. 
The high grade hospitals in urban areas are often overcrowded with patients. Long queues 
wait in doctors’ waiting rooms and rampant scalpers resell medical appointments at 
extortionately high prices; patients pay under-the-table payment to doctors with the intention 
to receive privileged treatment (Eggleston, et al., 2008; Kou & Shi, 2009). At the same time, 
the low grade hospitals and clinics are underutilized and patronized by few patients. This 
leads to an imbalance between demand for and supply of healthcare resources. 
Zhou (2008) asserts that the price regulation in the health sector is one plausible reason. 
Wherever there is a need to queue up, the price is undervalued. The existence of scalpers 
reselling appointment numbers in leading hospitals indicates severe under-pricing. Zhou 
regards under-the-table payment is a natural reflection of the distorted price in the health 
sector. People are willing to pay more for health service but the price is regulated. Some 
other scholars assert there is distrust in lower grade hospitals. People are worried that they 
could not get good treatment in community hospitals which are among low-grade hospitals. 
Even if it takes long time to get treated in higher grade hospitals, they still choose leading 
hospitals. Scholars therefore suggest that more subsidies should provide to improve health 
services in community hospitals (Yang & Liu, 2008). 
Pilot projects have been implemented at a sub national level to disperse patients from high 
grade hospitals to low grade hospitals. For example, in Shanghai, the Basic Medical 
Insurance Scheme reimburses a higher share of health expenditure for people visiting 
community hospitals compared to higher grade hospitals for certain diseases. In Beijing, 
People’s Hospital of Beijing University – a third grade hospital – established a “healthcare 
community” with two community healthcare centers and 16 community healthcare clinics in 
September 2007. Within the community, healthcare institutions share information and 
resources and implement mutual transferals. The community aims at guiding people to 
“community hospitals with simple ailments and large hospitals with serious diseases” 
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(commonly phased “xiaobing zai shequ, dabing jin yiyuan” in Chinese) (Bai, 2001; Bai, 
2008). 
However, there is no nationwide program targeting the problem yet. As Yip & Hsiao (2009) 
stated, the new reform announcement in April 2009 “is less specific on how to improve 
efficiency and quality within the health system. The announcement's call for a “pilot” of 
public hospital reform is akin to an admission that more research must be done before more 
specific policy guidelines can be drawn up in this area.” 
 3 An Analytical Study 
In this chapter, I develop a quality competition model of hospitals under regulated prices. 
The purpose of this model is to show the effect of different price regulation on hospitals’ 
behaviors and demand for healthcare services. I use different cost coefficients to capture the 
difference between high-grade hospitals and low-grade hospitals. When price difference is 
very small, expanding it appropriately could give high-grade hospitals more incentive to 
improve quality of healthcare services and competition could urge low-grade hospitals to 
keep certain level of healthcare quality. Since people attach great value to health and pay 
great attention to qualities of healthcare services, high quality would lead to high demand for 
healthcare services and also high utility level of patients. Expanding the price difference 
between hospitals appropriately when existing price difference is small could bring about 
positive effects from the aspects of healthcare quality and patients’ utilities. 
3.1 The basic model 
3.1.1 Framwork 
We consider a price-regulated healthcare market with two hospitals, labeled as H and L. H 
denotes high-grade and L low-grade. Their prices are exogenously fixed at .  p
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q p u u
Patients’ healthcare demand to hospital  not only depends on the quality of service 
provided by hospital  but also the quality of service provided by its competitor. Since 
people have to pay healthcare service out-of-pocket or at least pay part of the total 
expenditure, demand for healthcare also depends on price. Let  and  be the number 
of patients wanting treatment at hospital H and L respectively. Let  and  be the 
quality of services provided by hospital H and L respectively. A demand function for H and 
L is assumed to be 
i
i
hq lq
hu lu
h h lα β γ= − + − l hu u and q p l=α β γ− + −  respectively, where 
α  is a constant term, β  is a very small positive number and (0,1)γ ∈ . I will discuss these 
coefficients in more detail below. 
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h
By investing more effort, hospitals can increase quality. Effort imposes a disutility on a 
hospital. Let  denote the total cost of treating  patients when hospital i  chooses 
quality . Hospitals are assumed to have a total cost function 
iC iq
iu h h hC c u q=  and , 
where  and  are fixed coefficients. 
l l lC c u q= l
h l
hc lc
This thesis considers self-interested hospitals seeking to maximize profit by choosing service 
quality when service prices are regulated and set by government. Hospital H’s Profit 
function is given by 
( ) ( )h h l h hp p u u c u p u uπ α β γ α β γ= − + − − − + −  
And hospital L’s Profit function is given by 
( ) ( )l l h l l l hp p u u c u p u uπ α β γ α β γ= − + − − − + −  
3.1.2 Interpretations of parameters 
1. γ is positive and assumed to be less than one (i.e. (0,1)γ ∈ ). The interpretation is that 
services provided by different hospitals are not perfect substitutes. It implies that 
although prices are the same, when one hospital provides higher quality than the other, 
there are still some patients visiting the latter one. One plausible reason is that patients 
take into account transportation cost when choosing hospitals. When hospitals are 
located at different places, people tend to choose the nearest one when quality is similar. 
2. and represent service quality of hospital H and L respectively. A natural 
measurement of a hospital’s service quality is the treatment outcome of patients’ illness. 
For patients, the better the treatment outcome, the higher their utility from treatment. 
So and also represent patients’ utilities from hospital treatment. 
hu lu
hu lu
3. Assume . The assumption means that the high-grade hospital has a lower cost 
coefficient than the low-grade hospital. I provide two arguments for this assumption. 
First, hospitals are affected by their reputation. Even though the actual services provided 
by two hospitals are exactly the same, patients may still believe the service quality of 
the high-grade hospital is better. This psychological effect exists in healthcare. Due to 
hc c< l
 this effect, high-grade hospitals need less effort to produce the same level of utility for 
patients. Another argument is that a high-grade hospital has more health resources and 
provides a large scope for healthcare services, which generates economics of scale and 
economics of scope. Hence it is reasonable to assume h lc c< . 
3.1.3 Hospitals’ strategic choices 
With previous assumptions, hospital H’s objective function is given by max( )
h
h h h hu
pq c u q−   
subject to h hq p u luα β= − + −γ . We get the first-order condition: 
( )h h h l h
h
p c p u u c u
u
0h
π α β γ∂ = − − + − − =∂  
Rearranging the expression, we get the reaction function of hospital H: 
 1( )
2 2 2h h
u p u
c 2l
β γ= + + − α  (1) 
Similarly, the reaction function of hospital L is 
 1( )
2 2 2l hl
u p u
c 2
β γ α= + + −    (2) 
With (1) and (2), we get the equilibrium solution of service qualities: 
a)  2
2( (2 ))
4 2
p
h
h l
pu
c c
γ αβ γγ γ= + + + −− −  (3) 
 2
2( (2 ))
4 2
p
l
l h
pu
c c
γ αβ γγ γ= + + + −− −  (4) 
And the equilibrium quantity of healthcare services is defined by: 
b)  ( ) ( )22 12 24 2ph h l
p rq
c c
αγ γ βγ γ
⎛ ⎞= − − − + +⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
  (5) 
 ( ) ( )22 12 24 2pl l h
p rq
c c
αγ γ βγ γ
⎛ ⎞= − − − + +⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
 (6) 
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 We obtain the quality difference 0
2
p p p l h
h l
h l
c cpu u u
c cγ
−Δ = − = ⋅ >+ . Under the same regulated 
price, the high-grade hospital provides a higher service quality.  
3.2 The model under different regulated prices 
Consider the case of different regulated prices for services of hospital H and L, denoted 
hp and lp respectively. It is rational to assume h lp p> . In this case, hospital H’s profit 
function becomes ( ) ( )h h h h l h h h h lp p u u c u p u uπ α β γ α β γ= − + − − − + − . And its objective 
function becomes max( )
h
h h h h hu
p q c u q− , subject to h h hq p u luα β γ= − + − . 
The first order condition of hospital H is 
( )h h h h h l h h
h
p c p u u c u
u
0π α β γ∂ = − − + − − =∂  
Again we obtain the reaction function of hospital H and hospital L: 
 1( )
2 2 2h h lh
u p u
c 2
β γ= + + −α    (7) 
 1( )
2 2 2l l hl
u p u
c 2
β γ α= + + −    (8) 
The solution of hospitals’ problem is given by: 
c)  * 2
1 1 1(2 ( ) ( ))
4 2h h lh l
u p p
c c
αβ γ βγ γ= + + + −− −  (9) 
 * 2
1 1 1(2 ( ) ( ))
4 2l l hl h
u p p
c c
αβ γ βγ γ= + + + −− −  (10) 
d)  ( )* 22 21 12 24 4h lh h l
p pq
c c
γ
2
αγ β βγ γ γ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − − + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ −
 (11) 
 ( )* 22 21 12 24 4l hl l h
p pq
c c
γ
2
αγ β βγ γ γ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − − + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ −
  (12) 
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 The quality difference is * * * 1 1 1[ ( ) ( )
2h l h lh l
u u u p p
c c
]β βγΔ = − = + − ++ . 
Since h lp p≥ and , we have which means high-grade would provide higher 
level of service quality.  
hc c< l * 0uΔ >
The derivatives of the equilibrium qualities with respect to prices are presented blow: 
 
*
2
2 1( ) 0>
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4
h
h h
u
p c
βγ
∂ = +∂ − ,
*
2
1( )
4
l
h h
u
p c
γ βγ
∂ 0= + >∂ − ,
* *2h l
h h
u u∂
p pγ
∂= ; ∂ ∂
 
*
2
2 1( ) 0>
4
l
l l
u
p c
βγ
∂ = +∂ − ,
*
2
1( )
4
h
l l
u
p c
γ βγ
∂ 0= + >∂ − ,
* *2l h
l l
u u∂
p pγ
∂= . ∂ ∂
i i
i
Proposition 1: The equilibrium quality of healthcare service provided by 
hospital increases when hospital ’s regulated price increases; the equilibrium quality 
of healthcare service provided by hospital  increases when its competitor’s regulated 
price increase. ( { },i H L∈ ) 
The economic interpretation of proposition 1 is that hospitals have high incentives to attract 
demand under a high regulated price by improving quality level of healthcare services so as 
to maximize profits. When a hospital has increased quality, the other hospital would increase 
quality also to compete for patients. This is why a hospital’s equilibrium quality also 
increases when its competitor’s regulated price increases. 
Also, we can get the derivatives of the equilibrium demand with respect to prices: 
 ( )* 221 12 24hh h
q
p c
γ βγ
⎛ ⎞∂ = − −⎜ ⎟∂ − ⎝ ⎠
, 
*
2
1 0
4
h
l l
q
p c
γ βγ
⎛ ⎞∂ = − +⎜ ⎟∂ − ⎝ ⎠
<  
 ( )* 221 12 24ll l
q
p c
γ βγ
⎛ ⎞∂ = − −⎜ ⎟∂ − ⎝ ⎠
, 
*
2
1 0
4
l
h h
q
p c
γ βγ
⎛ ⎞∂ = − +⎜ ⎟∂ − ⎝ ⎠
<  
Proposition 2: When its regulated price increases, change in demand for healthcare 
services provided by hospital  (i { },i H L∈ ) depends on the relative magnitude of the 
 cost coefficient andβ ; its equilibrium demand decreases when competitor’s regulated 
price increases. 
The economic interpretation of proposition 2 is that although a hospital improves its 
healthcare quality when its competitor’s regulated price increases, it has a lower 
improvement than its competitor and hence the demand for its healthcare services still 
decreases. The uncertainty of effect on demand of own price change is because patients 
consider both price and quality when choosing a hospital. When the improvement in quality 
is not large enough to compensate the increase in price, people would turn to the other 
hospital. 
3.3 Effect of expanding price difference 
In this section I analyze what would happen if increase hp to and decrease
'
hp lp to
'
l
p  while 
keeping  constant. More specifically, we want to see the effect on healthcare quality, 
demand for healthcare and patients’ total utility after expanding the price difference and 
keeping  constant.  
*
lu
*
lu
Define  and . Define' 0l <llp p pΔ = − ' 0h h hp p pΔ = − > *' *h h hu u uΔ = − and . We 
rewrite the reaction function of hospital H and L after expanding price difference:  
*' *
l l lu u uΔ = −
 *' ' '2
1 1 12
4 2h h lh l
u p p
c c
αβ γ βγ γ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
−
 *' ' '2
1 1 12
4 2l l hl h
u p p
c c
αβ γ βγ γ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
− . 
1) When keeping the service quality of hospital L constant (i.e. 0luΔ = ), we find that 
 220huΔ >  (13) 
                                              
22 See Appendix D for proof 
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 Expanding price difference leads to a higher service quality of hospital H. The logic behind 
is as follows: When hospital L charges lower and hospital H charges higher, if hospital H 
and L keep their quality levels of healthcare services unchanged, some of hospital H’s 
patients (and potential patients) will choose hospital L instead. Hence hospital H has to 
improve service quality to sustain enough demand.  
2) When keeping hospital L’s quality constant and expanding price difference, we 
get . Demand for healthcare services provided by hospital L decreases. This 
is because hospital H improves its quality and attracts a part of patients from hospital L. 
With respect to demand for hospital H and total demand, we get 
/ 0l l lq p cΔ = Δ <
 
1/0,
1/0,
h
h
h
if c
q
if c
β
β
<>⎧Δ ⎨ ≥≤⎩ , and
( )( )
( )(
1/ 2 / /0,
( )
1/ 2 / /0,
h l l
h l
h l l
if c c p p
q q
if c c p p
β
β
< + Δ Δ>⎧Δ + ⎨ ≥ + Δ Δ≤⎩ )
h
h
0
lq
≤
+ <
.23
Since , we have  / 0l hp pΔ Δ <
  
( )( )
( )( )
0 1/ 2 / / , 0 ( )
1/ 2 / / 1/ , 0 ( ) 0
1/ , 0 ( ) 0
h l l h h h l
h l l h h h h l
h h h
c c p p q q q
c c p p c q q q
c q q
β
β
β
< < + Δ Δ Δ > Δ + >⎧⎪ + Δ Δ ≤ < Δ > Δ +⎨⎪ ≥ Δ ≤ Δ⎩
In the model, β measures the sensitivity of healthcare demand to changes in price.   
When , healthcare demand is relatively price inelastic. Quality 
plays a critical role in the demand for healthcare services. In this case, the increase in 
demand for hospital H’s healthcare service due to improvement in quality is so large that it 
exceeds the decrease in demand for service provided by hospital L. Hence total demand for 
healthcare services increases. When
( )(1/ 2 / /h l lc c p pβ < + Δ Δ )h
1/ hcβ ≥ , people attach relative large weight to price, 
and expanding price difference would lead to decreasing access to healthcare. In this case, 
although hospital H improves quality level, demand for its healthcare service decreases since 
price increases. The effect of expanding price difference leads to decreased access to 
healthcare. When , demand for healthcare services 
provided by hospital H increases after expanding price difference. But its increase is large 
( )( )1/ 2 / / 1/h l l hc c p p β+ Δ Δ ≤ < hc
                                              
23 See Appendix D for deduction in detail. 
 21
 enough to offset decrease in demand for healthcare services provided by hospital L. Hence 
total demand for healthcare services decreases. 
Discussions above imply that the effects of expanding price difference depend on the price 
elasticity of demand for healthcare services. Ringel et al. (2002) make a literature review on 
healthcare demand elasticity and find that price elasticity of demand for healthcare tends to 
center on -0.17. This is plausible. When people get sick, they will not be very price sensitive. 
Hence the case that ( )( )1/ 2 / /h l lc c p pβ < + Δ Δ h
0
 stands a good chance. And it is worth while 
to further discuss the change in patients’ utility in this case. 
3) If , we find that( )h lq qΔ + > ( ) 0h h l lq u q uΔ + > .24 When , 
expanding price difference leads to increase in total demand for healthcare services. Hospital 
H would improve its quality level and treat more patients. Hospital L keeps its quality level 
constant. This implies that more patients are treated and more patients are serviced by better 
healthcare services. The compounding effects of increase in quality and quantity of 
healthcare services lead to a great improvement of patients’ utility. Hence when expanding 
price difference leads to increasing demand for healthcare services, the total utility of 
patients also increases. 
( )(1/ 2 / /h l lc c p pβ < + Δ Δ )h
The discussions above are summarized in proposition 3. 
Proposition 3: When increase hp and decrease lp simultaneously while 
keeping constant, we get following results:  *
0
lq
≤
+ <
0
                                             
lu
i. ; 0huΔ >
ii. ; 
( )( )
( )( )
0 1/ 2 / / , 0 ( )
1/ 2 / / 1/ , 0 ( ) 0
1/ , 0 ( ) 0
h l l h h h l
h l l h h h h l
h h h
c c p p q q q
c c p p c q q q
c q q
β
β
β
< < + Δ Δ Δ > Δ + >⎧⎪ + Δ Δ ≤ < Δ > Δ +⎨⎪ ≥ Δ ≤ Δ⎩
iii. if . ( ) 0h h l lq u q uΔ + > ( )h lq qΔ + >
 
24 See Appendix D for proof. 
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4 Conclusion 
In this article, I present a quality competitive model of hospitals under regulated price and 
analyze the effects of regulated prices on hospital behaviours and patients’ utilities. Prices 
for healthcare services are regulated in China. Hospitals are classified into three grades. In 
my model, I capture the difference between high-grade hospitals and low grade hospitals 
with different cost coefficients. Expanding price difference among hospitals to coordinate 
demand and supply of different grade hospitals has been used by provincial governments in 
China. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a theoretical analysis of this policy. 
The present analysis shows that expanding price difference has potential to promote high-
grade hospitals to improve healthcare quality. This is a positive effect. However, the total 
utility of patients not only depends on healthcare quality but also accessibility to healthcare. 
When people’s demand for healthcare is price inelastic or people attach a relatively small 
weight to price compared with quality, total demand for healthcare services would increase 
after expanding price difference and total utility level of patients would increase as well. But 
when people attach great value on price compared with quality, then total demand for 
healthcare services would decrease instead. The results of the model imply that the effect of 
expanding price difference is closely associated with the price elasticity of demand for 
healthcare.  
The price elasticity of demand is affected by various factors, like income and health 
insurance coverage. Covered by health insurance, patients would be less sensitive to price 
and demand becomes less elastic. Arrow (1963) discussed the potential effect of health 
insurance on demand for healthcare. People with high income could afford more on 
healthcare and might be less price elastic. Hence the impact of expanding price difference 
depends on other socioeconomic conditions. In wealthy provinces where most residents are 
covered by various health insurance programs, expanding price difference is much likely to 
produce social welfare. However, in poor provinces with few populations covered by health 
insurance, the policy might not generate many positive effects and may even bring negative 
effects. Therefore policymakers need to pay attention to the comprehensive condition of the 
health sector when apply the strategy to hospitals.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Resources and Total Expenditure in the Health Sector 
Year 
Number of 
Health 
Worker 
Number of 
Hospital 
Beds 
Number of 
Health 
Institutions
Year 
Number of 
Health 
Worker 
Number of 
Hospital 
Beds 
Number of 
Health 
Institutions
1978 3105572 204.17  169732 1994 5307009 313.40  191742 
1980 3534707 218.44  180553 1995 5373378 314.06  190057 
1981 3796121 223.38  190126 1996 5419002 309.96  322566 
1982 3957804 228.03  193438 1997 5516176 313.45  315033 
1983 4090030 234.16  196017 1998 5535682 314.30  314097 
1984 4213646 241.24  198256 1999 5570048 315.90  300996 
1985 4313011 248.71  200866 2000 5591026 317.70  324771 
1986 4445919 256.25  203139 2001 5583932 320.12  330348 
1987 4564122 268.50  204960 2002 5238079 313.61  306038 
1988 4677512 279.49  205988 2003 5274786 316.40  291323 
1989 4786959 286.70  206724 2004 5356589 326.84  297540 
1990 4906201 292.54  208734 2005 5426851 336.75  298997 
1991 5025134 299.19  209036 2006 5619515 351.18  308969 
1992 5140246 304.94  204787 2007 5907052 370.11  298408 
1993 5215416 309.90  193586 2008 6169050 403.87  278337 
Source: China health Statistical Yearbook 2009, China Statistical Yearbook 2008, China Statistical 
Yearbook 1999 
From 1978 to 2007, the number of health workers, hospital beds and health institutions has 
increased less than 1 time. But the total health expenditure has increased dramatically.  
Appendix B: Total Health Expenditure Components 
Total Health Expenditure (100 million) Total Health Expenditure Components (%) 
Year 
Total 
expenditure
Government 
Expenditure 
Social 
Expenditure
Individual 
Expenditure
Government 
Share 
Social 
Share 
Individual 
Share 
1978 110.21 35.44 52.25 22.52 32.2 47.4 20.4 
1979 126.19 40.64 59.88 25.67 32.2 47.5 20.3 
1980 143.23 51.91 60.97 30.35 36.2 42.6 21.2 
1981 160.12 59.67 62.43 38.02 37.3 39.0 23.7 
1982 177.53 68.99 70.11 38.43 38.9 39.5 21.6 
1983 207.42 77.63 64.55 65.24 37.4 31.1 31.5 
1984 242.07 89.46 73.61 79.00 37.0 30.4 32.6 
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1985 279.00 107.65 91.96 79.39 38.6 33.0 28.5 
1986 315.90 122.23 110.35 83.32 38.7 34.9 26.4 
1987 379.58 127.28 137.25 115.05 33.5 36.2 30.3 
1988 488.04 145.39 189.99 152.66 29.8 38.9 31.3 
1989 615.50 167.83 237.84 209.83 27.3 38.6 34.1 
1990 747.39 187.28 293.10 267.01 25.1 39.2 35.7 
1991 893.49 204.05 354.41 335.03 22.8 39.7 37.5 
1992 1096.86 228.61 431.55 436.70 20.8 39.3 39.8 
1993 1377.78 272.06 524.75 580.97 19.7 38.1 42.2 
1994 1761.24 342.28 644.91 774.05 19.4 36.6 43.9 
1995 2155.13 387.34 767.81 999.98 18.0 35.6 46.4 
1996 2709.42 461.61 875.66 1372.15 17.0 32.3 50.6 
1997 3196.71 523.56 984.06 1689.09 16.4 30.8 52.8 
1998 3678.72 590.06 1071.03 2017.63 16.0 29.1 54.8 
1999 4047.50 640.96 1145.99 2260.55 15.8 28.3 55.9 
2000 4586.63 709.52 1171.94 2705.17 15.5 25.6 59.0 
2001 5025.93 800.61 1211.43 3013.89 15.9 24.1 60.0 
2002 5790.03 908.51 1539.38 3342.14 15.7 26.6 57.7 
2003 6584.10 1116.94 1788.50 3678.66 17.0 27.2 55.9 
2004 7590.29 1293.58 2225.35 4071.35 17.0 29.3 53.6 
2005 8659.91 1552.53 2586.41 4520.98 17.9 29.9 52.2 
2006 9843.34 1778.86 3210.92 4853.56 18.1 32.6 49.3 
2007 11289.50 2297.10 3893.72 5098.66 20.4 34.5 45.2 
Source: China Healthcare Statistical Yearbook 2009. 
Appendix C: Classification Standards for General Hospitals in China 
Indicators and criteria for hospital classification mainly include five components: 
1. Hospital scale, measured by four aspects which are the number of hospital beds, 
buildings, staff and department. 
2. Hospital technical level; 
3. Healthcare facilities; 
4. Hospital’s governance, measured by seven aspects which are director’s 
qualities, work management, information management, modern management 
skills, hospital infection control, resource utilization and economic efficiency. 
5. Hospital quality, measure by the following aspects: diagnosis quality, treatment 
quality, nursing quality, performance quality and comprehensive quality. 
 Some specific requirements for general hospitals have been summarized in following table. 
Hospital 
classification 
Hospital 
beds 
Department setting (lowest requirements) staffing 
The 1st grade 
general hospital 
20-99 
beds 
Clinical Departments: Emergency room, 
Internal Medicine, Surgery, Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, Preventive Medicine; 
Other Departments: Pharmacy, Laboratory, 
Radiology, Sterilization room. 
At least 0.7 health worker per bed; 
At least 3 doctors, 5 nurses and 
corresponding pharmaceutical, testing 
and radiating health workers; 
At least 1 doctor holding the title 
attending physician or above(included in 
the 3 doctors) 
The 2nd grade 
general hospital 
100-499 
beds 
Clinical Departments: Emergency room, 
Internal Medicine, Surgery, Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, Preventive Medicine, 
Pediatrics, Ophthalmology, E.N.T., 
Stomatology, Dermatology, Infectious 
Disease; 
Other Departments: Pharmacy, Laboratory, 
Radiology, Physiotherapy, Sterilization 
room, Operating Room, Pathology, Blood 
bank, Medical records Department. 
At least 0.88 health worker and 0.4 nurse 
per bed; 
At least 3 doctors holding the title 
associate chief physician or above; 
At least 1 doctor holding the title 
attending physician or above at each 
department. 
The 3rd grade 
general hospital 
>500 beds Clinical Departments: Emergency room, 
Internal Medicine, Surgery, Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, Preventive Medicine, 
Pediatrics, Ophthalmology, E.N.T., 
Stomatology, Dermatology, Infectious 
Disease, Chinese Medicine, Rehabilitation; 
Other Departments: Pharmacy, Laboratory, 
Radiology, Physiotherapy, Sterilization 
room, Operating Room, Pathology, Blood 
bank, Medical records Department, Nuclear 
Medicine, Transfusion, Nutrition, Clinical 
function examination room. 
At least 1.03 health worker and 0.4 nurse 
per bed; 
Doctors holding the title associate chief 
physician or above at each professional 
department; 
At least 2 clinical nutritionists; 
Engineering technical personnel (i.e. 
technician, assistant engineer or higher 
levels) should account for more than 1% 
of the staff. 
Source: Ministry of Health (1990):”General Hospital Classification Management Standard (trial 
draft)” (in Chinese), Ministry of Health, Beijing, China. 
Appendix D 
Proof of expression (13): 
Proof. 
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Combining the previous expression with expression (10), we get 
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β= + , we can rewrite the previous equation 
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have
0A B> > 0hpΔ >
2 0lh
p Bp A γ
ΔΔ = − > . 
*' *
2 2
2 ( )2 2 0
4 4
h
h
h l h
h h h
p Ap Ap A p B p Au u u
2
γγγ
γ γ
− ΔΔ +Δ + Δ ΔΔ = − = = = >− −  
Since , is positive ( ). 0hp AΔ > huΔ 0huΔ >
Deduction of  ,  and : lqΔ hqΔ ( )h lq qΔ +
( )22 21 12 24 4l hl l h
p pq
c c
γγ β βγ γ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛Δ ΔΔ = − − − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞⎟⎠
 
( )22 21 1 14 2( )4 4l hl l l h
p pq
c c c
γγ β βγ γ
⎛ ⎞Δ Δ⇔ Δ = − − + − +⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
2 2
2 1 1
4 4
l l h
l
l l h
p p pq
c c c
γβ βγ γ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛Δ Δ Δ⇔ Δ = − + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞⎟⎠
 
2
1 1 12
4
l
l l h
l l
pq p p
c c ch
β γ βγ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛Δ⇔ Δ = − Δ + + Δ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟⎠
 
Since 1 12 0l h
l h
p p
c c
β γ β⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞Δ + + Δ + =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ , we have 
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Proof of expression ( ) 0h h l lq u q uΔ + > when ( )h lq q 0Δ + > : 
Proof. 
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Since , ,Δ < and0huΔ > ( ) 0h lq qΔ + > 0lq * 0uΔ > , we have ( ) 0h h l lq u q uΔ + > . 
